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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On appeal, Keith Dean Clark challenges the district court's decision to deny his
motion to suppress.

He asserts that because he carried a flashlight while riding his

bicycle, which Officer Dennis acknowledged that he observed before initiating the stop,
he complied with the law that requires that a light be attached to either the bicyclist or
the bike to illuminate the pathway during certain hours of the day. To the extent the
statute may be read to require something more than carrying a light to illuminate one's
path, it is ambiguous and the ambiguity of the meaning of the word "attached" should be
construed in Mr. Clark's favor.

Because Officer Dennis lacked reasonable articulable

suspicion to stop Mr. Clark, the stop was unlawful and, therefore, all evidence obtained
after the stop should have been suppressed by the district court.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 20, 2010, Garden City Police Officer Dennis observed two bicyclists
riding their bikes, one of whom was Mr. Clark. (Tr., p. 7, Ls.4-23, p.8, Ls.18-23.) Both
bicyclists had lights displayed to the front.

(Tr., p.9, Ls.7-10.) When Officer Dennis

passed the bicyclists, he determined that Mr. Clark may have been carrying his
flashlight in his hand. (Tr., p.9, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Clark testified that the flashlight did have
a loop which was around his hand. (Tr., p.4, Ls.10-17.) Officer Dennis did not recall the
flashlight having any type of string or loop wrapped around Mr. Clark's hand. (Tr., p.11,
Ls.10-14.) The district court concluded that Officer Dennis's belief that Mr. Clark only
carried the flashlight was reasonable. (Tr., p.12, Ls.8-19.)

1

The prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Clark by Information with the crimes of
possession of a controlled substance, concealing a dangerous weapon, and possession
of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.23-24.) Mr. Clark filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.3031.) He argued that Officer Dennis lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe
that he violated I.C. § 49-723. (R., pp.23-24.) Therefore, he argued all evidence after
the unlawful stop should be suppressed as fruits of an unlawful stop. (R., pp.23-24.)
The State responded and argued that a flashlight being carried is not affixed or
attached to a person. (R., pp . 33-35.) The State focused its analysis on the term "affix,"
defining it for the district court utilizing Black's Law Dictionary.

(R., pp.33-35.)

The

State also argued that even if the flashlight was attached around Mr. Clark's wrist the
officer was reasonable in his mistake and, therefore, had the authority to stop Mr. Clark.
(R., pp.33-35.)
The district court conducted a suppression hearing.

(Tr., p.1, L.1-p.12, L.5.)

Both Mr. Clark and Officer Dennis testified. (Tr., p.1, L.1-p.12, L.5.) The district court
denied the motion. (Tr., p.12, Ls.6-7.) The court determined that:
Even if it turned out that that light was actually affixed to the bike, as long
as the officer had a good-faith belief that it looked to him like he was
holding onto it and that that's the reason that he pulled him over, he was
entitled to pull him over and check that out.
(Tr., p.12, Ls.14-19.)

The district court went on to hold that as a matter of law the

statute prohibits a person from holding the flashlight.

(Tr., p.15, Ls.

12.) The court

stated, "the plain language of the statute, which requires that the light be attached, and
they use the word 'attached to the bicycle or the rider,' that would exclude holding it."
(Tr., p.15, Ls.9-12.)

As further clarification the district court stated, "holding onto the

flashlight is not the same as having the flashlight attached
Ls.13-15.)
2

to the rider." (Tr., p.15,

Mr. Clark entered into a conditional plea preserving his right to challenge the
district court's denial of his motion to suppress.

(Tr., p.16, Ls.23-25 ) He agreed to

plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance; in exchange, the State agreed to
recommend a unified five-year sentence, with one-year fixed, with five years of
probation. (Tr., p.16, L.22-p.17, L.8.) The district court accepted the plea agreement
and imposed the recommended sentence. (Tr., p.50, Ls.13-15.) The court suspended
executing Mr. Clark's sentence and placed him on probation. (Tr., p.50, L.21.) The
district court filed a Judgment of Conviction and Order Suspending Sentence reflecting
the district court's oral pronouncement. (R., pp.59-64.) Mr. Clark timely appealed. (R.,
pp.67-69.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Clark's motion to suppress because Officer
Dennis lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe Mr. Clark violated the law
that requires a bicyclist to have attached to his person or bike a light to illuminate his
path during certain hours of the day because Officer Dennis observed Mr. Clark holding
a flashlight properly illuminating the road before initiating the stop?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Clark's Motion To Suppress Because
Officer Dennis Lacked Reasonable. Articulable Suspicion To Believe Mr. Clark Violated
The Law That Requires A Bicyclist To Have Attached To His Person Or Bike A Light To
Illuminate His Path During Certain Hours Of The Day Because Officer Dennis Observed
Mr. Clark Holding A Flashlight Properly Illuminating The Road Before Initiating The Stop

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it denied Mr. Clark's motion to suppress. Prior to

stopping Mr, Clark, Officer Dennis observed Mr. Clark holding a flashlight illuminating
the road

Therefore, Officer Dennis lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop

Mr. Clark, and all evidence obtained thereafter should be suppressed,

B.

The Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated " State v. Holland,

135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged,
the appellate court should "accept the trial court's findings of fact which were supported
by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to
the facts as found." Id.
Construction and application of statutes are purely legal questions and, therefore,
reviewing courts exercise free review.

McGee v. JD. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328, 332

(2000); Mitchell v. Bingham, 130 Idaho 420 ( 1997). When faced with the interpretation
of a statute, the appellate court begins with an examination of the statute's literal words.
State v. Bumight, 133 Idaho 654, 659 (1999). "Where the language of a statute is plain
and unambiguous, th[e] court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging
in statutory construction." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646 (2001 ).

5

C.

Mr. Clark's Stop Was Unconstitutional Because Officer Dennis Lacked
Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To Believe Mr. Clark Violated The Law
Requiring Bicyclist to Illuminate The Path During Certain Hours Of The Day
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable

searches and seizures.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

The Idaho Constitution contains a

virtually identical provision which protects its citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures. ID. CONST. art. I, § 17; State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 22 (Ct. App. 2002).
Searches and seizures without a valid warrant are presumed unreasonable and violate
the provisions of both constitutions.

State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 640 (2003).

If

evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement,
the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit
of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The purpose
of these constitutional rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the
exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's
privacy and security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824
(Ct. App. 2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).
An officer may conduct an investigatory stop without violating an individual's
constitutional rights if, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer has reasonable
suspicion to believe that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.

State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 379 (Ct. App. 2003). When challenged, the State
bears the burden to prove a valid investigatory stop. State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260 (Ct.
App. 2001 ).

The State must demonstrate that at the time of the stop the officer

possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in, or about to
engage in, criminal activity.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).

"The officer's

suspicion must be more than a mere hunch[.]" State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509,
6

515 (2001 ).

'"Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped for
criminal activity."' Wilson v. Idaho Transportation Department, 136 Idaho 270, 274 (Ct
App. 2001) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 499 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981)). Utilizing
these limiting principles, when an officer possesses reasonable, articulable suspicion to
conclude that a bicyclist has committed a traffic infraction, an officer may stop the
bicyclist. LC.§§ 49-714, 49-1503.
Idaho requires bicyclists to illuminate the roadway for at least 500 feet in front of
them between sunset and sunrise and at any other time insufficient lighting exists. I.C.
§§ 49-903, 49-723.

The purpose of the requirement is to improve visibility.

See id.

Idaho Code section 49-723 requires that:
Every bicycle in use at the times described in section 49-903, Idaho Code,
shall be operated with a light emitting device visible from a distance of at
least five hundred (500) feet to the front. attached to the bicycle or the
rider, and with a reflector clearly visible from the rear of the bicycle.
Mr. Clark possessed a light. (Tr., p 9, Ls.7-10.) His light was visible to others for
the proper distance; however, Officer Dennis believed that the law required more. (Tr.,
p.9, Ls.7-10, p.11, Ls.10-14.)

Officer Dennis believed that a string attached to the

flashlight wrapped around Mr. Clark's wrists would have been sufficient.

(Tr., p.11,

Ls.10-14.) However, the law does not demand this. The purpose of the statute is to
have a light to illuminate the path in front of the bicyclist. Mr. Clark did what the law
wanted him to do

have a light to illuminate the road in front of him. The flashlight was

attached to Mr. Clark when he held it in his hand. Officer Dennis lacked reasonable,
articulable suspicion to believe Mr. Clark violated the law requiring him to have attached
to his person a light to illuminate his path because, before initiating the stop, he
observed Mr. Clark holding the flashlight.
7

D.

Assuming Arguendo That The Statute Is Ambiguous Because Both The District
Court's Interpretation Requiring A Person To Do More Than Hold A Flashlight
And Mr. Clark's Interpretation That Holding A Flashlight Meets The Definition Of
Attaching It To His Person Are Reasonable, The Rule Of Lenity Demands That
Mr. Clark's Interpretation Control
Alternatively, if this Court finds that the statute is ambiguous because the district

court's interpretation and Mr. Clark's interpretations are both reasonable, the rule of
lenity requires that the statute be interpreted in Mr. Clark's favor.

Thus, holding a

flashlight would be sufficient to be in compliance with the law.
"The principle of lenity mandates that criminal statutes be read narrowly and,
where ambiguity exists, in a manner that provides leniency toward defendants." State v.

Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 566 (Ct. App. 1999).

The due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment requires that a criminal statute give fair warning of the conduct
that it makes criminal

Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1964). The

rule of lenity is considered a manifestation of the fair warning requirement under the
right to due process.

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259. 265-66 (1997); see also

State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99 (2008) (citations omitted) ("The rule of lenity states that
criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of defendants.") and State v.

Shanks, 139 Idaho 152 (Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing the applicability of the rule of lenity
to an ambiguous statute in Idaho).

The United States Supreme Court wrote on the

cannons for interpreting an ambiguous statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152
(1990). The Court stated:
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored
interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of
8

the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define
criminal liability.

Id. at 1001-1002, As is noted above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the premise
that they give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law, one of the
quintessential requirements of due process of law.

Inherent in the concept of fair

warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute.
Justice Scalia further wrote on this premise in a concurring opinion in United
States v. RJC., 503 U.S. 291 (1992).

The concurrence concluded, "that it is not

consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal statute against
a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history. Once it is determined that the
statutory text is ambiguous, the rule requires that the more lenient interpretation
prevail." Id. at 293 (Scalia, J. concurring).
Here, the Legislature made its policy clear within in the statute.

The statute

provides:
Every bicycle in use at the times described in section 49-93, Idaho Code,
shall be operated with a light emitting device visible from a distance of at
least five hundred (500) feet to the front, attached to the bicycle or the
rider, and with a reflector clearly visible from the rear of the bicycle.
I.C. § 49-723. The purpose of the statute is inherent in the language of the statute - to
increase visibility by illuminating the pathway during certain hours of the day.

I.C.

§ 49-723. Although there is no indication that the Legislature intended to require that a

bicyclist's light be securely affixed to something, assuming arguendo, that the statute is
ambiguous because both the district court's interpretation and Mr. Clark's interpretation
are reasonable, this Court should interpret the statue utilizing the principles of lenity.
This Court should find in favor of Mr. Clark and conclude that the Legislature did not
9

require more than that a person illuminate a path while riding a bicycle during certain
hours of the day; a requirement with which Mr. Clark complied.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Clark respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Judgment of Conviction,
reverse the district court's order denying his motion to suppress, and remand for
dismissal.
DATED this 19th day of October, 2011.
/

t;~~:~;:LK~{Lh,t>~, .....
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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